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	<title>R&#38;R Consulting &#187; cautionary tales</title>
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	<link>http://creditspectrum.com</link>
	<description>Bringing science back to financial engineering</description>
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		<title>Financial Times Interviews R&amp;R&#8217;s Raynes and Rutledge about Moody&#8217;s</title>
		<link>http://creditspectrum.com/2008/11/financial-times-interviews-rrs-raynes-and-rutledge-about-moodys/</link>
		<comments>http://creditspectrum.com/2008/11/financial-times-interviews-rrs-raynes-and-rutledge-about-moodys/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2008 11:33:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ann Rutledge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moody's Investors Service]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sylvain Raynes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cautionary tales]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[&#8220;In the late &#8217;90s, research and development at Moody&#8217;s slowed right down,&#8221; says [Ann] Rutledge. &#8220;The banks caught up. And then they came to be the ones in the lead.&#8221; As the structured finance arms race accelerated, Moody&#8217;s and its peers became more passive participants. Where the firm had once been at the cutting edge [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span class="dquo">&#8220;</span>In the late &#8217;90s, research and development at Moody&#8217;s slowed right down,&#8221; says [Ann] <span style="font-weight: bold;">Rutledge</span>. &#8220;The banks caught up. And then they came to be the ones in the lead.&#8221; As the structured finance arms race accelerated, Moody&#8217;s and its peers became more passive participants. Where the firm had once been at the cutting edge of statistic analysis (analysing facts) and stochastic analysis (analysing probabilities), soon it found itself trying to keep pace with the latest engineering packages devised by the&nbsp;banks.</p>
<p><span class="dquo">&#8220;</span>Over time, disagreements with analysts were just smoothed out. And it was no longer the rating agency which always won,&#8221; says [Sylvain] <span style="font-weight: bold;">Raynes</span>, who left Moody&#8217;s to set up his own credit analysis consultancy. &#8220;The banks won. Now the modelling is done by the&nbsp;street.&#8221;</p>
<p>The agencies were inundated with a huge volume of new structured finance deals that they were being asked to rate. At Moody&#8217;s, the flipside to the huge revenue growth was a high-pressure work environment. One analyst recalls rating a $1bn structured deal in 90 minutes. &#8220;People at the rating agencies used to say things like, &#8216;I can&#8217;t believe we got comfortable with that deal,&#8217;&#8221; says <span style="font-weight: bold;">Raynes</span>. &#8220;People talk about moral hazard at the banks, but the moral hazard for the rating agencies is&nbsp;extreme.&#8221;</p>
<p>Read the rest of this full-feature article at <span style="font-style: italic;">Financial Times</span>, &#8220;<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/65892340-9b1a-11dd-a653-000077b07658.html">When Junk Was Gold</a>,&#8221; by Sam&nbsp;Jones.</p>
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		<title>The Collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge</title>
		<link>http://creditspectrum.com/1970/11/the-collapse-of-the-tacoma-narrows-bridge/</link>
		<comments>http://creditspectrum.com/1970/11/the-collapse-of-the-tacoma-narrows-bridge/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 1970 23:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Curmudgeon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sylvain Raynes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cautionary tales]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[A cautionary tale about&#160;finance
The collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, due to unforeseen resonance effects, is more than a watershed in the history of bridge design and civil engineering. It is an object lesson in the need to fully understand a problem before designing its&#160;solution.
The Tacoma Narrows Bridge, November 7th 1940
Bridges and airplanes represent decades [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">A cautionary tale about&nbsp;finance</span></p>
<p>The collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, due to unforeseen resonance effects, is more than a watershed in the history of bridge design and civil engineering. It is an object lesson in the need to fully understand a problem before designing its&nbsp;solution.</p>
<div style="TEXT-ALIGN: center"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_4decZgxPPD4/Rrtc6Z-VDxI/AAAAAAAAAAM/48XFZvGnPyE/s1600-h/tacoma.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5096769561774329618" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_4decZgxPPD4/Rrtc6Z-VDxI/AAAAAAAAAAM/48XFZvGnPyE/s320/tacoma.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;"><span class="btxtdark1">The Tacoma Narrows Bridge, November 7th 1940</span></span></div>
<p>Bridges and airplanes represent decades or centuries of know-how handed down to us in the form of physical theories and engineering standards. The same would be true for finance, if we did not have such a high tolerance for violating the trust and wasting the wealth and savings of&nbsp;others.</p>
<p>The main reason why the architects of deal disasters not only survive their mistakes but go on to create new ones is that deal “blow ups” lack tragic and visible consequences. But, if fumbling financiers were held as accountable for their structures as fumbling bridge-builders are, the field of finance would soon become a science as precise as bridge&nbsp;building.</p>
<p>Accountability is only possible where there is feedback. Financial feedback is not measured in terms of body count or ruins at the bottom of Puget Sound. It consists of broken promises, wasted money and squandered opportunity. Financial loss can only be quantified in light of the original promise to pay. That promise can only be understood by understanding the deal&nbsp;itself.</p>
<p>The way of the deal has never been specified formally because the question of the deal has never been posed, let alone answered. The question of the deal is not the most important question in finance. It is not even the most significant question in finance. It is the only question in finance. It is the reason why you are&nbsp;here.</p>
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